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Abstract 
The doctrine of karma has been praised as a rational and morally edifying explanatory 
response to the existence of evil and apparent injustice in the world. Critics have attacked it 
as a morally misguided dogma that distorts one’s vision of reality. This essay, after outlining 
the traditional doctrine, examines three criticisms that have been central to recent debates: 
firstly, that the doctrine offers no practical guidance; second, that it faces a dilemma between 
free will and fatalism; and third, that it involves a morally repugnant form of blaming victims 
for their own misfortunes. Possible responses are considered, the depth of the disagreement is 
highlighted, and a morally significant difference between alternative ways of articulating the 
belief in karma is analyzed.   
 
1. Introduction 
‘Karma doctrine transformed the world into a strictly rational, ethically-determined cosmos; 
it represents the most consistent theodicy ever produced by history.’ S  wrote Max Weber in 
The Religion of India, first published in 1916.1 Since the law of karma is often assumed to 
operate independently or at least semi-independently of a supreme deity, some would 
question the aptness of the term ‘theodicy’ in this context, opting instead for an alternative 
such as ‘Cosmodicy’ (Huxley 1947: 68), ‘anthropodicy’ (Larson 2003Ś 254–5) or 
‘karmadicy’ (Herman 1987); but the idea that the doctrine of karma constitutes an impressive 
response to the existence of evil in the world has been widely endorsed.2 
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Whether this doctrine has been a blessing or a curse to those religions that have adopted 
it, however, remains a vexed question. Some commentators have lauded it as ‘a doctrine of 
hope’ due to the prospect of eventual moral and spiritual perfection that it is deemed to 
promote (Yamunacharya 1967: 72);3 others have dubbed it ‘a philosophy of despair’ due to 
its purportedly fatalistic implications (Kuppuswamy 1977: 46).4 Some find it to be morally 
‘comforting’, ‘soothing’ and ‘satisfying’ (Wadia 1965) as well as an intellectually 
satisfactory – ‘or rather, the least unsatisfactory’ – solution to the problem of evil (Nayak 
1993: 146, 182);5 others condemn it as either ‘completely vacuous as a principle of moral 
guidance’ (Edwards 1996Ś 42) or as the playing of ‘a cruel joke on the credulity of the 
masses’ (Kuppuswamy 1977Ś 47), ‘a convenient tool for explaining away the perceived 
inequality in human society’ (Ramendra 2011Ś 56). 
This essay will critically examine some recent debates concerning the morality of belief 
in karma and in the closely allied notion of rebirth or reincarnation. To make sense of these 
debates it will first be necessary to offer some remarks on the nature of the karma doctrine 
itself and its place within South Asian religious traditions (section 2). Then will ensue 
discussion of three serious charges recently brought against the doctrine: namely, that it is 
morally vacuous (section 3), that it involves an irresolvable dilemma concerning moral 
agency (section 4), and that it cruelly blames victims for their own afflictions (section 5). 
Possible responses will be considered along the way, and (in section 6) attention will be given 
both to the depth of basic moral disagreement that often divides opponents in debates over 
karma and to the scope that exists for divergent ways of articulating karma-related beliefs, 
especially with regard to whether those articulations are self- or other-directed. In conclusion 
(section 7) I will propose that the doctrine of karma is not well conceived as a theoretical 
product of inductive (or, as one critic has put it, ‘counter-inductive’) reasoningś it is better 
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envisaged, at least for the most part, as a constitutive element in a worldview within which 
believers seek to make sense of the suffering and contingencies of life. 
 
2. The Doctrine of Karma 
Deriving from the verbal root k栗 (‘to do, make, perform, accomplish ...’), karma is the 
nominative singular form of the Sanskrit noun karman.6 In its widest sense ‘it means any act, 
intentional or unintentional, moral or amoral’ (Pandeya 1967Ś 98)ś but in the context of what 
has come to be known as the doctrine of karma it denotes a morally evaluable action plus the 
potential or power of that action to bring about a particular result or consequence, which is 
liable to come to fruition some time after the commission of the action itself, perhaps in a 
future life (Krishan 1997: 4). Crucially, the consequences that are most pertinent here are 
ones that bear upon the experience or well-being of the agent herself. As an early Buddhist 
scripture puts itŚ ‘By you ... has the seed been sownś Thus you will experience the fruit’ 
(Bodhi 2000: 328).7 
Scholarly opinion on the origins of the karma doctrine is divided. While it is generally 
agreed that its earliest formulations occur in some of the oldest Upanishads, there remains 
considerable dispute both over the antiquity of these texts and over the question whether the 
doctrine evolved within Vedic Brahmanism itself or, alternatively, was appropriated from 
cultural groups located towards the eastern region of the Gangetic plain – the region from 
which Buddhism, Jainism and the now defunct ゾj┆vikas hailed.8 Fortunately, for the purposes 
of this essay it will not be necessary to resolve these complex historical matters.9 
In Buddhist traditions, karma (or its Pダli equivalent, kamma) is often explicitly 
understood to encompass the intention behind or volition with which the action is performed; 
hence it has been defined as ‘volition and that which is effected by it’ (AbhidharmakoWa 4.1, 
quoted in Griffiths 1982: 281).10 Thus the emphasis is placed on its being voluntary actions 
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that generate ‘merit’ or ‘demerit’ for the agent (Arnold 2012Ś 31), with the perhaps somewhat 
crude analogy of a ‘bank account of karma’ often being invoked to convey this idea 
(Schlieter 2013). 
Schools of classical Indian philosophy have developed more or less sophisticated models 
of the psychological processes that characterize the relations between karma, rebirth and 
spiritual fulfilment. For instance, the school of Yoga associated with Patañjali (c. th rd–fourth 
century CE) speaks of our ordinary actions being rooted in particular forms of ignorance; 
these actions generate psychological impressions and traces, the accumulation of which 
determines the type and duration of one’s next life along with the modes of experience one 
will undergo (Bryant 2009: 198–202). Though different schools have their own nuanced 
systems of doctrine and practice, Yoga shares with other Brahmanical branches of Indian 
philosophy, as well as with Buddhism and Jainism, a concern with liberation from sa駒sダra 
(the cycle of rebirth). Both Yoga and Buddhism maintain that progress can be made towards 
this goal in the short to medium term by maximizing virtuous actions and minimizing vicious 
ones; the longer-term objective, however, is to eradicate the ‘root’ of ignorance and to 
thereby remove the source of all further action and tainted experience. This requires sustained 
meditative discipline and the cultivation of non-attachment to worldly phenomena (Bryant 
2009: 47–8; Burley 2007: 130–1).11    
Since rebirth traditions deriving from South Asia hold the fructifying of merit in pleasant 
and of demerit in unpleasant experience to be an operation built into the very structure of the 
universe, the phrase law of karma has commonly been used to denote it (Lopez 2008: 21–2). 
Like Kant (1956: 166), a proponent of the karma doctrine would be apt to identify both ‘the 
starry heavens above’ and ‘the moral law within’ as strictly law-governed. Unlike Kant, 
however, such a proponent would not be apt to draw a sharp distinction between moral and 
natural law. Psychology and cosmology tend to blur together in the South Asian rebirth 
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traditions, with the concept of dharma being a capacious principle that encompasses both 
right action and the orderly functioning of the universe as a whole (Koller 1972).  
Although there has historically been a strong conceptual link between karma and 
rebirth,12 the two concepts ought not to be conflated, for there exist beyond South Asia 
numerous forms of belief in rebirth that make no reference to karma.13 Moreover, it has been 
observed that among Hindus and Buddhists there is a growing tendency to regard karma as 
operating within a single lifetime instead of over several lives.14 Some scholars have 
characterized this tendency in terms of ‘demythologization’; that is, an attempt to make the 
doctrine more consistent with a modern scientific worldview, according to which the idea of 
a soul or causally connected ‘stream of consciousness’ undergoing a succession of lives is, at 
best, highly suspect and, at worst, incoherent.15 It is beyond the scope of this essay to give a 
detailed account of the multiple competing interpretations of karma and rebirth that have 
been developed both historically and in the contemporary world. However, the fact that there 
is not just one commonly agreed upon version of the doctrine will become relevant at certain 
stages of my discussion below, which will focus on some recent controversies over the 
doctrine’s moral implications. 
 
3. Moral Vacuity? 
It is often assumed that believing in karma brings with it normative implications for how one 
ought to act. Some claim that these implications are laudable: the belief gives one a reason to 
behave virtuously, knowing that immoral behaviour leads to future suffering. Others declare 
the implications to be baleful: one will have a justification for neglecting the misfortunes of 
others, presuming them to be the natural consequences of past sins on the sufferer’s part. Paul 
Edwards, however, has argued that the doctrine of karma provides no guidance for action 
whatsoever: although it does, he maintains, have ramifications for our attitudes towards 
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victims of suffering (ramifications that will be discussed in section 5 below), it is devoid of 
any practical significance. This is because, given a certain essential feature of belief in karma, 
it turns out that absolutely anything one does must be presumed to be the ‘right thing’ to do 
(Edwards 1996: 42–3). 
The essential feature in question is the belief in universal justice – h  idea that, 
notwithstanding any appearances to the contrary, the world is in the final analysis a perfectly 
just place.16 If one holds this as a non-negotiable, or categorical, assumption, then it follows, 
Edwards maintains, that regardless of what eventuates, and hence regardless of whether we 
assist those who are in need (or whether our efforts to do so are successful), ‘the ltimate 
outcome will be just, in the sense that every human being will be getting exactly – no more 
and no less – what he deserves’ (1996: 43). The problem that this belief generates can be 
illustrated by an example. We might imagine a soldier on a battlefield – l t us call him Arjuna 
– who is perplexed about whether to take part in the imminent fight between feuding 
cousins.17 Should he participate, and thus run the risk of having h s kinsmen’s blood on his 
hands, or should he refrain, thereby foregoing his duty as a warrior? If one assumes that 
universal justice obtains, it hardly seems to matter what he does. If he slaughters his cousins, 
then it must be the case that they ‘deserved’ to die. If, on the other hand, he lays down his 
weapon and is himself slain, then this must be what justice demands. Necessarily, whatever 
happens, it must be right; and hence, it seems, the decision is arbitrary. Morality is abolished. 
Many would call this view ‘fatalism’. But Edwards is willing to concede to the believer in 
universal justice that it need not be fatalistic (1996: 42–3). By this, Edwards means that 
universal justice need not preclude human freedom. To return to my example, it could be that 
Arjuna has a genuine choice, that whether he charges into battle or retreats to the sidelines is, 
in some meaningful sense, up to him.18 To say that he has no choice in the matter would, on 
Edwards’ view, be fatalistic. But the believer in a supremely just world need not say this; 
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instead, she can say that, despite its being ultimately up to Arjuna what he does, whichever 
decision he makes will turn out to be in perfect accordance with justice. Whether there really 
is room for a conceptual distinction between fatalism and this w atever-happens-i just view 
remains contentious, however.19 
Francis Story offers an instructive real-life example that is germane to the present issue. 
He cites the case of a doctor who specializes in pulmonary diseases and is also a Buddhist. 
While acknowledging the carcinogenic effects of smoking, the doctor himself remains ‘a 
fairly heavy cigarette smoker’, remarking that even if ‘[a]ll the physical causes of cancer’ are 
present, cancer will develop only if the individual’s karma is ‘also a predisposing factor’ 
(Story 2000: 45). Is this a fatalistic attitude? Talk of ‘predispositions’ and ‘physical causes’ 
implies that karma is not perceived as fully determining whether one contracts cancer, and 
yet the doctor’s apparent sanguinity about his own habit implies that he supposes karma to 
play the major role. Even with this latter point in view, however, it does not look as though 
the doctor’s attitude is fatalistic in a strictly deterministic sense of that term, which seems to 
be the sense that Edwards is privileging when he concedes that belief in karma need not be 
fatalistic. But the case is complicated, and we should not of course rule out the possibility of 
some degree of incoherence or self-deception on the doctor’s part. 
A believer with a more ‘totalizing’ conception of karma’s operations may admit that, 
were the doctor to contract cancer, it is his heavy smoking that would be the primary causal 
factor, while adding that it is the doctor’s karma that is responsible for his smoking in the first 
place; that is, were it not for certain bad deeds performed by him in the past (including in 
previous lives), the doctor would not have suffered the misfortune of taking up the habit. 
Such a view of karma’s role starts to sound far more deterministic, as it may be construed as 
implying that it is not only the outcomes of certain of our decisions that are karmicly 
determined, but the decisions themselves. Further complications are present in the case of an 
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activity such as smoking, whose strongly addictive character may preclude its being 
straightforwardly described as freely chosen on anyone’s account.20 But if we return again to 
Arjuna on the battlefield, it looks as though the proponent of the totalizing conception is 
liable to say that his ‘decision’ whether or not to fight is itself the outcome of past karma – it 
is just part of an ongoing mechanistic process within which we are all mere instruments 
rather than free agents.21 
Despite Edwards’ concession to the believer in karma, other commentators have been less 
willing to distinguish belief in universal justice from fatalism (where ‘fatalism’ is construed 
in a strictly deterministic sense). One recent critic of the moral value and coherence of the 
belief has presented the problem facing the believer in terms of a dilemma, which I shall 
discuss in the next section. 
 
4. A Karmic Dilemma? 
As we have seen, Edwards’ complaint about the karma doctrine is that it lacks any capacity 
for moral guidance: since, on the assumption that the universe is inherently just, any 
practically achievable outcome would itself be just, what ordinarily appear to us as morally 
serious decisions are in fact arbitrary. This arbitrariness would be a disastrous result for 
advocates of karma, who vaunt its morally edifying potential. Further difficulties for the view 
that karma offers a viable response to the problem of evil have been raised in recent work by 
Whitley Kaufman (2005, 2007). One of these difficulties takes the form of a dilemma, one 
horn of which bears a close resemblance to Edwards’ charge of moral vacuity. 
The dilemma concerns what Kaufman sees as an irresolvable tension between universal 
justice and free will. If one believes in universal justice, then one believes that everything that 
happens (or, we might say, everything that happens which has any moral significance) is 
morally just; in effect, there is no moral evil, because any putative ‘victims’ of apparently 
9 
 
evil acts must have received only what they deserved. The one who performs the act cannot 
be blameworthyŚ she is an instrument of karmic law, like ‘the executioner who delivers the 
lethal injection’ (Kaufman 2005Ś 25) – or, if we take the metaphor f an ‘instrument’ more 
strictly, like the syringe through which the lethal injection is administered. And yet the very 
idea of desert presupposes the possibility of free agency. Without it, moral responsibility 
would be eliminated, and then no one would be deserving of praise or blame: apparently 
moral judgements would have become vacuous. So belief in universal justice – and hence in 
the law of karma – seems both to require belief in free moral agency and to obviate it. 
One way of responding to a dilemma of the sort just outlined would be to protest that it 
relies on an artificial philosophical reconstruction of belief in karma as opposed to a faithful 
account of how the belief manifests in the everyday lives of those who hold it. While it is 
undoubtedly true that some philosophical defenders of the so-called ‘theory’ of karma seek to 
portray it as ‘logical’ or ‘scientific’, in contrast with what they see as mere religious dogmas 
such as the idea of God’s providential will,22 it may well be the case that such would-be 
apologists are attempting to defend a chimera. And if that is so, then the ‘theory’ attacked by 
the philosophical enemies of karma may be a chimera too. 
Kaufman openly admits that what he is criticizing is really ‘a simplified, idealized version 
of the karma-and-rebirth doctrine, one abstracted as far as possible from particular historical 
or doctrinal questions’ (2005Ś 16). He is right to point this out, for if we attend to the lives of 
believers in karma, we are apt to witness a frequent intermingling of other beliefs: beliefs, for 
example, concerning the capacity of gods or spirits to intervene on one’s behalf if propitiated, 
to unleash their ire if angered, or to affect the course of one’s life by their capricious or 
mischievous games.23 We will also discover a multiplicity of forms that the belief in karma 
itself can take. As one sceptical commentator remarksŚ ‘Whether the celebrated law of Karma 
ruling the universe is deterministic and causal or probabilistic, essentially retributive or 
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essentially reformative, basically moral or metaphysical, seems open to serious dispute’ 
(Chari 1967: 128).24 Some varieties of the belief include, for instance, ideas not only of cross-
species rebirth but also of salvation being directly achievable ‘by birds, animals, reptiles, 
insects and even plants’ (Meenakshisundaram 1967Ś 26). Others regard this as an absurdity, 
and maintain, moreover, that talk of ‘an evil-doer [being] reborn as an animal’ can mean only 
‘that there will be a predominant degree of animality in that human form’ (Sastri 1967Ś 
118).25 
Nevertheless, Kaufman justifies his simplifying approach by pointing to the fact that, 
since the nineteenth century, efforts have been made to develop the karma doctrine into ‘a 
complete, systematic theory of the origins and explanation of human suffering’ (2005Ś 18). It 
is those attempts at what we might call systematic karmology that constitute the immediate 
object of Kaufman’s attack, irrespective of the more ragged assortment of karma-related 
convictions that manifest in the lives of ordinary believers. Given Kaufman’s explicit 
admission that he is abstracting away from ‘historical or doctrinal questions’, it is surprising 
to find, in a response to his initial essay, the charge that his critique’s ‘underlying weakness 
... consists in a lack of proper attention to the original sources and to the historical and 
doctrinal background in which the theory of karma is set’ (Chadha and Trakakis 2007: 550–
1). Had he insinuated that he was dealing with conceptions of karma in all their historical and 
doctrinal complexity, this charge would have been fairś but in the light of Kaufman’s 
unequivocal demarcation of his target, it seems somewhat misplaced. 
Whatever we think about the critical reach of Kaufman’s claim that a systematized 
version of karma faces a crippling dilemma, there is another, even more emphatically moral, 
objection to karma that surely does find purchase against the doctrine in some of its everyday 
as well as its more systematized forms. The objection is that the belief in karma, at least in its 
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retributive varieties, involves an odious mode of ‘blaming the victim’, and it is to this 
objection that I shall now turn.   
 
5. Blaming Victims? 
From time to time believers in karma come out with statements that strike those who do not 
share their belief (and perhaps some who do share it, or something like it, as well) as morally 
outrageous. Examples are not hard to find, and the sheer apparent heartlessness of such 
statements has undoubtedly done much to damage the moral standing of the doctrine in the 
eyes of many. It is not only in ancient spiritual or legal texts that, for example, people 
afflicted by oppression and poverty or who have physical or intellectual impairments are 
declared to be suffering the consequences of their own former sins;26 uch declarations are 
also heard in the contemporary world, often to the exasperation and dismay of campaigners 
against social discrimination who perceive them as throwbacks to a ‘pre-modern’ or 
‘medieval’ era.27 
In some instances, it seems almost as though the believer in karma has, under sceptical 
questioning, been pushed into a corner; she supposes that her belief system must have the 
resources to account for all apparent injustices and instances of pain and misery, and this 
supposition prompts her to make speculative assertions that more careful moral reflection 
might have guarded against. An instance of this sort occurs in an interview with a Tibetan 
Buddhist tulku named Lati Rimpoche (a ‘tulku’ being a high spiritual preceptor who has been 
recognized as the reincarnation of a previous master).28 During the conversation, the 
interviewer, Richard Hayes, puts to Lati Rimpoche the awkward question of how he would 
account for the trauma undergone by countless Jewish children under Nazi persecution in the 
1930s and ’40s. Confronted with a question of this kind, we might expect, or perhaps hope, 
that the only honest answer would be that there is simply no way of accounting for such 
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horrors: as the Buddha himself is alleged to have said, the precise working out of the results 
of karma is among the ‘inconceivable matters’, conjecturing about which ‘would reap either 
madness or frustration’ (Bodhi 2012Ś 463). 
Lati Rimpoche, however, does not forego conjecturing. Speaking via an interpreter, he 
replies: 
 
The proper Buddhist answer to such a question is that the victims were experiencing the 
consequences of their actions performed in previous lives. The individual victims must 
have done something very bad in earlier lives that led to their being treated in this way. 
Also there is such a thing as collective karma. (Quoted in Hayes 1998: 76)29 
 
Hayes, pressing him on this reference to ‘collective karma’, asks what ‘an individual [can] do 
to change the karma of the group that he or she belongs to’. ‘You can change all karma 
through practice’, answers the Rimpoche. ‘You can persuade the group to adopt pure 
attitudes and to develop pure practices.’ Again Hayes pursues the point, asking whether the 
suggestion being made is ‘that the Jews may have suffered the humiliations of the holocaust 
because they did not live up to Jewish standards of purity, or rather because they did not live 
up to Buddhist standards ...’. The Rimpoche replies that ‘[t]here are attitudes that all peoples 
regard as pure’, such as ‘[b]eing kind to other people’, but adds that he does not ‘know 
specifically about the history of the Jews’ (77). 
Some would say that, whether one knows about the history of a group of people or not, 
speculating that they, either individually or collectively, ‘must have done something very 
bad’ to deserve becoming victims of a genocidal regime hardly exemplifies kindness. Indeed, 
some would say that it ‘is nothing but adding insult to injury’ (Kuppuswamy 1977Ś 44), the 
raising of ‘the “blame the victim” idea into a systematic principle’ (Kaufman 2007Ś 559). 
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Paul Edwards, despite maintaining, as we have seen, that the doctrine of karma ‘provides no 
guidance on how to act’, remarks that it nevertheless has noxious implications for how we 
should look upon others. So ‘horrifying’ are some of these implications, Edwards observes, 
that ‘believers in Karma, especially those in the West, are careful not to spell them out, if 
they are aware of them’ (1996Ś 43). In the case of Lati Rimpoche, it seems, we have a 
believer, speaking to a western audience, who is not afraid to spell out the implications that 
Edwards and others find so appalling. 
The people of Lati Rimpoche’s own country, Tibet, have of course suffered grievously 
since the Chinese invasion of 1950. Hayes proceeds to inquire whether he believes these 
circumstances to be ‘the consequence of impurity of practice within Tibetan culture as a 
whole’. Once again the response given by Lati Rimpoche, who successfully escaped from his 
occupied homeland in 1964, is stark: 
 
I’m sure that those Tibetans who were left behind to suffer great hardships under the 
Chinese Communists must have done something very bad in previous lives to deserve 
such consequences. It could be that in former lives they tortured other people or were 
responsible for injustice. As a result they must now live under an unjust system. (Quoted 
in Hayes 1998: 77) 
 
In contrast to the Rimpoche’s conviction that proportionality obtains between the amount 
and intensity of suffering in the world on the one hand and the seriousness of the 
transgressions committed by those who endure it on the other, Kaufman expresses incredulity 
– with which many will sympathize – that the severest of torments could be even remotely 
proportionate to any transgressions, even if the cumulative aggregation of sins over myriad 
lifetimes is taken into account (2005: 21– ). In response, Chadha and Trakakis have proposed 
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that such incredulity is apt to dissolve when one contemplates ‘the brutality and ruthlessness’ 
of which human beings are capable (2007: 538). Their point could be elaborated by noting 
that anthropogenic atrocities such as the Nazi holocaust and the Chinese abuses in Tibet 
themselves epitomize the depths of evil to which humans can sink, thereby supplying 
examples of precisely the sorts of behaviour for which horrendous suffering would constitute 
just retribution. For those willing to venture down this track of reasoning, there cease to be 
any forms of suffering so severe that they could not, in principle, be ‘explained’ by reference 
to the sufferers’ past-life sins.30 
In reply, perhaps surprisingly, Kaufman turns the problem into one of numbersŚ ‘it is 
simply implausible that so many people could have been so evil’ (2007Ś 557). By putting it in 
these terms, Kaufman implies that a world containing fewer instances of suffering than ours 
would be one in which it were easier to accept that, even in its most extreme forms, suffering 
is invariably deserved. An alternative response, and one that is already suggested in 
Kaufman’s initial essay, would be to question how certain modes of suffering could figure in 
any system of justice, whether human, divine or cosmic.31 A response of this latter kind 
would be indicative of a deep moral disagreement between the participants in the dispute. 
The capacity to see the condition of someone who has been crushed by intolerable afflictions 
as just retribution for something she ‘must’ have done in a previous life is a mode of 
perception that others will not share. It involves seeing the person in a different light from 
that in which she would be seen by someone who never associates suffering with natural or 
divine retribution in this way. 
Invoking the notion of the law of karma as merely an aspect of the natural cosmic order, 
the believer in karma may deny that her own perception of the situation entails any moral 
disapproval or blame. From this perspective, declaring that victims of persecution must have 
acted badly in previous lives is simply a matter of stating the facts. Furthermore, she might 
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add, perceiving people in this way need have no direct bearing on how one behaves towards 
them: benevolent action may be the appropriate response, regardless of the aetiology of their 
condition. Those who do not accept the belief, meanwhile, might struggle to see how 
perceiving someone as responsible for her own misfortune could fail to be, in itself, a form of 
moral evaluation. Indeed, they might say, the very assumption that designating someone as 
deserving of her mistreatment could constitute a non-evaluative description displays a kind of 
moral obtuseness – an ignorance of the extent to which such descriptions are imbued with 
evaluative connotations. From this point of view, even if the believer in karma actively 
strives to alleviate the victim’s suffering, the moral character of the act will not be separable 
from the mode of perception. It will, in other words, remain an act of assisting someone who 
is assumed to have brought the trouble on herself, as opposed to an act of assisting an 
innocent (though that difference need not, in itself, entail one or the other act’s being 
construed as straightforwardly ‘better’ or ‘worse’).32 
 
6. Oneself and Others 
Apologists for an emphatically retributive conception of karma are often willing to ‘bite the 
bullet’ with respect to the charge that it involves blaming victims for the misfortunes they 
experience; the doctrine does blame the victims, they admit, but not unfairly so, for the 
‘victims’ are themselves the guilty onesŚ ‘Our misery and happiness are in exact proportion to 
our wickedness and virtue’ (Nayak 1993: 59). The doctrine is saved from fatalism and 
cruelty, it will be added, due to its vehement rejection of passivity in the face of affliction. As 
one prominent western defender of Buddhism has put it, ‘even if all deserve their suffering, 
in that they have caused it, there is no excuse for callous indifference to their suffering by 
those more “fortunate”’ (Humphreys 1983Ś 38–9). While critics may see the callousness in 
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the very willingness to regard the suffering as deserved, defenders seek to shift the focus of 
discussion towards the doctrine’s implications for remedial action. 
Looking back to the early teachings of Buddhism, Bhikkhu Bodhi reports that, without 
claiming belief in karma and rebirth to be the foundation of ethics, the Buddha had 
emphasized its role as ‘a strong inducement to moral behavior’ (2005Ś 3). Spelling out what 
he means, Bodhi observes that recognizing the potential of ‘our good and bad actions’ to 
‘rebound upon ourselves, determining our future lives and bringing us happiness or 
suffering,’ affords ‘us a decisive reason to avoid unwholesome conduct and to diligently 
pursue the good’ (ibid.).33 Again, from an alternative moral perspective, one may feel 
perturbed that this purportedly ‘decisive reason’, far from encouraging moral behaviour, is 
itself decidedly unwholesome – replacing, as it does, genuinely moral motivation with 
unalloyed self-interest. That the desire to receive reward and escape punishment in the 
afterlife might have a corrupting rather than edifying effect has long been a complaint made 
against certain eschatologies. Why, it has been asked, should we not regard virtuous 
behaviour as intrinsically good, irrespective of its potential to bring happiness (Jantzen 1984: 
37)? ‘[S]hould we do the right because it is right,’ asks Bruce Reichenbach, ‘or should we do 
it because it is in our best interests and to our benefit?’ Opting for the latter, he submits, 
would ‘falsify the character of morality’ (1990: 137–8).34 
It is not my purpose to try to resolve this clash between opposing conceptions of virtuous 
action. Rather, my point is to signal how deep the disagreement goes. So deep is it that 
proponents of the belief in karma, at least in its retributive form, frequently fail to 
comprehend how anyone could find objectionable their apparently instrumental 
understanding of morality. Those who are repelled by what they see as the emotional cruelty 
of blaming the victim, meanwhile, cannot countenance how one could adhere to a 
metaphysical doctrine with such unpalatable moral implications; they tend, therefore, to 
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regard ‘an a priori conviction that karma is true’ as having deluded believers into ‘a distorted 
conception of reality’ (Kaufman 2007Ś 557). Another of my tasks in this penultimate section, 
however, is to highlight a difference between applying the retributive conception of karma to 
others and applying it to oneself. As the case of Lati Rimpoche’s remarks (cited in section 5 
above) illustrates, expressions of what the believer conceives as natural implications of the 
karma doctrine can often sound, as Edwards’ puts it, ‘unbearably cruel’, even lacking in due 
humility (1996: 14, 46). Yet the sentiment can resonate differently when voiced with regard 
to one’s own situation. 
Poignant examples can be found in the memoir of Ani Pachen, a Buddhist warrior-nun 
who was imprisoned by the Chinese regime for her part in the Tibetan uprising of the 
1950s.35 Among the many instances of torture she describes is one in which, under 
interrogation, Pachen was subjected to a merciless whipping with wet willow sticks by prison 
guards. ‘Before they reached me I felt the drops of water flicking off the sticks’, she writes. 
 
Then they were on me. They lashed my face, my hands, my back, my feet, my head. Om 
Mani Peme Hum, I whispered under my breath. Guru Rinpoche. ... My ears were 
beginning to ring, and my face was burning. My previous karma, I thought. The pain will 
eliminate my sins. (Pachen and Donnelley 2001: 217) 
 
This harrowing passage exemplifies the profound insight that we gain from Pachen’s memoir 
into the religious sensibility that informs her perspective on life and the world. Under 
conditions of intense physical and psychological abuse, the thoughts that come to her mind 
are not coloured by hatred or resentment. Initially she recites a mantra, venerating the ‘jewel-
lotus’ (ma喰i-padme), traditionally associated with AvalokiteWvara, the ‘Bodhisattva of 
compassion’ (Lopez 1988Ś 7ś 1998Ś ch. 4). She also invokes Guru Rinpoche (‘Precious 
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Master’), the common Tibetan name for Padmasambhava, who is popularly revered for 
having converted Tibet ‘into a realm of Dharma’ (Lin 2003Ś 150).36 But there is no sign of 
self-pity in Pachen’s accountś while taking responsibility for her situation by referring to her 
past karma, she views the trauma that she is undergoing as a kind of purification.37 
Elsewhere, Pachen prays that her own tribulations may relieve those of others (2001: 
243). Praying also that the sins of her persecutors, including Chairman Mao himself, may be 
‘cleared’, she attributes their egregious behaviour to their own former karma (256).38 The 
relationship is complex between these different strands of belief – th  belief, for example, 
that both the suffering of the persecuted and the brutality of the persecutor can somehow be 
consequences of the respective individuals’ past-life actions. When abstracted from the life in 
which they are expressed, these strands may appear incongruous; yet when seen in the 
context of the life as a whole, they coherently mesh together – it is in the life that we see their 
intelligibility. 
The respective passages from Lati Rimpoche and Ani Pachen exemplify two ways of 
inheriting and articulating the doctrine of karma as it obtains within the Tibetan Buddhist 
tradition. There is, on the face of it, no contradiction between themŚ holding one’s own 
suffering to be a result of one’s past actions is not merely consistent with holding the 
sufferings of others to be results of their past actions, but is internally related to it – another 
aspect of the same belief. However, the infusion of Pachen’s words with self-effacing good-
will towards her fellow sufferers, combined with her acknowledgements that committing evil 
is itself a kind of misfortune (the most serious misfortune of all), strikes a moral tone that is 
not evident in Lati Rimpoche’s confident assertions concerning the victims of Nazi tyranny 
and the ‘Tibetans who were left behind’. One way of capturing the difference would be to say 
that, while the mode of expression exemplified in the passages from Lati Rimpoche exhibits a 
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cold detachment in the face of others’ suffering, that exemplified by Pachen wears 
compassion on its face. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The suggestions I have made in the preceding section concerning different forms – r at least 
different emphases – that the doctrine of karma can take are really only a beginning. A fuller 
treatment of these issues would have to pay attention also to the many ways in which the 
doctrine has been amended and re-envisioned during recent times, incorporating themes and 
tropes from evolutionary biology for example.39 I hope, however, enough has been said to 
indicate that the moral implications of the karma doctrine are not a simple matter and that the 
question whether, as Weber maintained, ‘it represents the most consistent theodicy ever 
produced by history’ is not one that can be answered with a straightforward affirmation or 
denial. 
Many believers in the law of karma claim to find it consoling. They regard it as 
contributing to a conception of a ‘law-abiding’ universe, ‘so constructed as to sustain moral 
values and uphold them’ (Rao 1967Ś 139). Critics have accused the makers of such claims of 
proceeding by means of counter-inductive reasoning – of inferring from the fact that the 
universe has been patently inequitable in the past that it will or must be supremely just in the 
long run. Such reasoning, Edwards complains, is ‘utterly perverse’ (1996Ś 33). What may be 
perverse, however, is the assumption that belief in karma has anything to do with inductive 
reasoning. The conviction that the universe is ultimately just is based neither on inductive nor 
on counter-inductive reasoning; rather, it is better characterized as a metaphysical-cum-
ethical vision, constitutive of a worldview within which the believer struggles to make sense 
of the phenomena of good and evil, joy and suffering, that she encounters from day to day. 
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Edwards is perhaps right to point out that the doctrine of karma, in itself, provides no 
practical moral guidance. It would, for example, be impossible to predict how someone will 
respond – or even how she would think she ought to respond – in a given morally pressing 
situation merely on the basis of knowing that she believes in karma; the possibilities are 
legion, and multiple other factors are liable to come into play. But this is, in large part, 
because the doctrine is not a normative ethical theory; it is one of a variety of cultural and 
religious elements that together provide believers with a rich conceptual palette by means of 
which to articulate their responses to a radically unpredictable and often apparently hostile 
world. It has, as Kaufman points out, been treated by many recent exponents as an 
explanatory theory; but even then, it is rarely presumed to offer precise moral guidance 
independently of culturally imbibed conceptions of duty.40 
Those who have no place in their lives for the belief in karma may wonder how anyone, 
faced with personal tragedy, could find it the least bit comforting to suppose the pain one is 
undergoing to be a result of things done in a previous life; they may, moreover, be appalled 
by the implications of this belief when applied to the tragedies of others. If such a belief is 
‘rational’, one might suppose, then the form of rationality it embodies is one devoid of due 
empathetic concern. Nevertheless, the hope that virtue must in the end be aligned with 
happiness is one that has reverberated throughout human history, stimulating the reflections 
of many great philosophers.41 If, under analysis, that hope appears forlorn or even morally 
corrupting, its persistence remains, at least, understandable. 
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